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1 INTRODUCTION 
In handing down its judgments in the 
controversial Gauteng e-tolling appeal 
in National Treasury v opposition to 
Urban Tolling Alliance,1 and the 
Marikana mineworkers’ legal 
representation imbroglio in Madigiwana 
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1 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC). For the High Court 
ruling that gave rise to this appeal, see 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v SANRAL 
2012 ZAGPPHC 63 (HC). 
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and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (Marikana 1)2, the 
Constitutional Court based its reasons for refusing to grant the interim relief sought in 
both cases on the doctrine of separation of powers. The Opposition to Urban Tolling 
Alliance (OUTA) had approached the Court in SANRAL 1,3 to interdict the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited (SANRAL) and the Minister of Transport from going 
ahead with the e-tolling arrangements on six Gauteng roads pending the substantive 
review application in the case; whereas in Marikana 1, the “injured and arrested 
persons” among the Marikana mineworkers had gone to court to enforce their right to 
legal representation at State expense.4 They, therefore, asked the Court for an order to 
compel the State and the Minister of Justice to pay the legal bills arising from their 
participation in the Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) established to uncover the 
truth behind the turbulence that engulfed the Marikana mine at Lonmin and the tragedy 
that befell the workers on 16 August 2012. In both cases, the applicants approached the 
High Court in Pretoria for interim interdicts. On each occasion, an appeal was lodged 
with the Constitutional Court against the High Court granting the interim order in 
SANRAL 1 but refusing it in Marikana 1. The question common to both cases was 
whether the apex court could hear appeals of that nature and make the orders sought. 
In pointing to the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court threw out the appeals 
citing the nature and subject matter of the disputes. Both cases involved executive 
decision making on matters involving budgetary issues and allocation of resources. 
Executive policy formulation was also in issue in SANRAL 1. Implicated in these 
circumstances are the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law whereby 
the courts apply self-restraint in order to avoid unduly trespassing unto the executive 
terrain. It is argued in this article that, although the Court was silent on the issue, the 
jurisprudential question of justiciability was implicated through those same reasons 
advanced by the Court for reaching the conclusion it did in both judgments.  In other 
words, the reasons behind its reluctance to adjudicate on such matters with regard to 
the nature and subject matter of the dispute are tantamount to saying that the issues 
before the Court were non-justiciable. Since the Constitutional Court gave so much 
weight in its judgment in SANRAL 1 to the doctrine of separation of powers, it is for this 
singular reason that the case has been identified here as the tip of the iceberg. This is so 
notwithstanding a wealth of recent case law on various aspects of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.5 However, brief mention needs to be made of the Marikana 1 
judgment in order to give the perspectives of the case in the present context. 
                                                 
2  2013 (11) BCLR 1251 (CC). For the high court ruling that gave rise to this appeal, see Magidiwana and 
another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others (No 1) 2014 (1) All SA 61 (GNP). 
3  SANRAL 1  at paras 7-8. 
4 Marikana 1at paras 1-6. 
5 See National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 2013 
(5) SA 571 (CC); SAAPIL v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) at paras 897B-902A; City of Cape Town v Premier, 
Western Cape  2008 (6) SA 345 (C) (the City of Cape Town) at paras 167-217 Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 (6) 
SA 249 (CC) (Mazibuko 2); and Justice Alliance of SA v President, RSA 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC) (Justice 
Alliance).   
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The Marikana 1 judgment starts with the proposition that a court can only 
entertain a matter, adjudicate over it and grant relief if there is a legal basis for doing so. 
In effect, there must be a constitutional source, a statutory authority, a subordinate 
legislative backing, or common law precedent to constitute the legal authority upon 
which the court can exercise its jurisdiction. A court does not make orders in vacuo. It 
does not engage in an academic exercise or indulge in hypothesising where its decision 
will have no practical effect.6 There must be a concrete dispute, a controversy between 
the parties in court,7 which means that, at least, the rightful plaintiff is in court and/or 
that the respondent against whom an order of court will be made is joined in the action. 
In the absence of the applicant/plaintiff having an interest in the matter as well as the 
absence of an appropriate defendant/respondent being in court, the court cannot 
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to determine the issue. The Constitutional Court had no 
doubt that the applicants in Marikana 1 made a case for fair representation, that there 
ought to be equality of arms in the proceedings of the Commission, but were the State 
and/or the Minister constitutionally or legally responsible to provide them with legal 
aid? Could an order be made against them or any of them where they or none of them 
did not have the constitutional or statutory obligation to provide the workers with legal 
aid? Was Legal Aid South Africa Legal Aid), the national institution established by 
statute and charged with the responsibility of providing legal representation to the 
indigent in society, properly brought into the proceedings? 8  
Ironically, the applicants focused on the State and the Minister. They did not 
challenge Legal Aid’srefusal to grant them legal aid in their original review application 
nor did they challenge the provisions of the Legal Aid Act of 1969 as unconstitutional. 
Surely, the applicants picked the clue from the pronouncements of the Constitutional 
Court in the interim appeal so that in their amended notice of motion on the review 
application, they rightly sought an order setting aside as unconstitutional, the 
respective decisions taken by the President, the Minister and Legal Aid to refuse them 
legal aid for the proceedings of the Commission. They also sought an order compelling 
the respondents to provide them with legal aid. In other words, with this vital 
amendment, the legal attack at the subsequent review application in Marikana 2,9 was 
properly directed at the public body clothed with the necessary legal framework to deal 
with legal representation on behalf of the State.  
                                                 
6 See Radio Pretoria v Chairman, Independent Communications Authority of SA 2005 (1) SA 47 (SCA); Rand 
Water Board v Rotek Industries (Pty) Ltd 2003 (4) SA 58 (SCA); National Colaition of Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (National Coalition)(at para 21 (noting that a case is 
not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy which should exist if a court is to 
avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law). 
7 The principles of “ripeness” whereby a court does not hear a case of which the dispute is yet to mature, 
and of “mootness” which means that there was nothing relevant in a matter that requires adjudication fit 
into this category. See Legal Aid South Africa v Magidiwana (2) 2014 (4) All SA 570 (SCA) (dismissed 
because the parties settled the matter).    
8 Section 3 Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969. 
9 See Magidiwana and another v President of the Republic of South Africa (No 2) 2014 (1) All SA 76 (GNP) 
(Marikana 2) at para 2. 
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2 THE FACTS AND JUDGEMENT IN SANRAL 1 
The applicant, OUTA, had approached the courts to interdict SANRAL and the Minister 
of Transport from going ahead with the e-tolling arrangements on six Gauteng roads 
pending the substantive review application in the case.10 It had sought an urgent 
pendente lite interdict prohibiting SANRAL from levying and collecting tolls on the roads 
pending the final determination of the Rule 53 review application for the setting aside of 
the decisions of SANRAL and the Minister of Transport, which gave rise to the 
declaration of the roads as toll roads in 2008. The applicant sought to impugn the 
decisions of SANRAL and the Minister of Transport on a number of grounds including: 
(a) procedural unfairness in failing to comply with the notice and comment procedure 
prescribed by section 27(4) of the South African National Road Agency Act 7 of 199811 
and section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA); (b) the 
tolling of the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (GFIP) amounted to an unlawful 
deprivation of the right to property under section 25 of the Constitution; (c) the 
decision to impose e-tolling was unreasonable because of its excessive operational costs 
and the practical impossibility of its enforcement; (d) the failure of the Minister of 
Transport to consider the costs of toll collection; and (e) that the 2006 estimate of the 
toll collection was incorrect.12 The applicant was successful on the interim order in the 
High Court. On appeal by the State, the Constitutional Court did not have to investigate 
any of these issues in the interim appeal as it pitched its judgment on its unwillingness 
to entertain appeals of this nature based on the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the unsuitability of the subject matter of the complaint for adjudication. 
Indeed, the Constitutional Court held that it could not enter into adjudication in 
SANRAL 1 because it was a policy issue involving: (a) a cabinet decision; (b) a decision 
of the Minister of Transport that users of the upgraded roads were the ones who must 
pay; and (c) the National Treasury’s domestic budgetary responsibilities and its 
sovereign debt policies.13 In other words, the Court would not enter into what belongs 
to the “heartland of executive-government function and domain”, such as the duty to 
determine how public resources are to be drawn upon and re-ordered especially where 
fraud or corruption was not alleged. Moseneke DCJ held that the power and prerogative 
to formulate and implement policy “on how to finance public projects reside in the 
exclusive domain of the National Executive subject to budgetary appropriations by 
Parliament”.14 Moseneke DCJ held further, first:  
A court must carefully consider whether the grant of the temporary restraining order 
pending a review will cut across or prevent the proper exercise of a power or duty that 
the law has vested in the authority to be interdicted. Thus courts a obliged to recognise 
and assess the impact of temporary restraining orders when dealing with those matters 
                                                 
10 SANRAL 1  at paras 7-8.. 
11 SANRAL Act 1998. 
12 SANRAL 2 at paras 21. 
13 SANRAL 1 at paras 34-35 (Moseneke DCJ). 
14 SANRAL 1at para 67. 
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pertaining to the best application, operation and dissemination of public resources. 
What this means is that a court is obliged to ask itself not whether an interim interdict 
against an authorised state functionary is competent but rather whether it is 
constitutionally appropriate to grant the interdict.15  
Secondly:  
A court must be astute not to stop dead the exercise of executive or legislative power 
before the exercise has been successfully and finally impugned on review. This approach 
accords well with the comity the courts owed to other branches of Government, 
provided they act lawfully. Yet another important consideration is whether in deciding 
an appeal against an interim order, the appellate court would in effect usurp the role of 
the review court. Ordinarily the appellate court should avoid anticipating the outcome of 
the review except perhaps where the review has no prospect of success whatsoever.16 
That the court found the appellant’s argument unattractive was summed up by 
Froneman J in his concurring judgment when he held:  
 
It is undisputed that in July 2007 the Cabinet approved the Gauteng Freeway 
Improvement Project and the concomitant basis for its funding, e-tolling, after 
extensive investigation and a report to it on the issue. It is national executive and 
treasury policy not to use fuel levy-type funding for these kinds of projects. None of 
this was, or could be, attacked on review in this Court. The playing field for the 
contestation of executive government policy is the political process, not the judicial 
one.17  
Froneman J also held: 
The main thrust of the respondent’s review application is the alleged unreasonableness of 
the decision to proclaim the toll roads. But unreasonableness compared to what? The 
premise of their unreasonableness argument is that funding by way of tolling is 
unreasonable because there are better funding alternatives available, particularly fuel 
levies. But that premise is fatally flawed. The South African National Roads Agency 
Limited has to make its decision within the framework of government policy. That policy 
excludes funding alternatives other than tolling. It is unchallenged on review.18  
3 JURISPRUDENTIAL ISSUES ARISING FROM SANRAL 1 
It has already been noted that the judgment of the Constitutional Court in SANRAL 1 did 
not address the doctrine of separation of powers as a ground for review. Instead, it 
applied it as a form of restraint as to the order a court could make in its quest for 
constructing the appropriate relief in the circumstances. Thus, the principle of 
separation of powers would naturally relate to a particular constitutional function 
                                                 
15 SANRAL 1 at para 66. See also International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa Ltd 
2012 (4) SA 618 (CC) (Scaw) at para 69. 
16 SANRAL 1 at para 26. 
17 SANRAL 1 at para 93. 
18 SANRAL 1 at para 94 (Froneman J). 
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which must properly belong to the judiciary in accordance with the constitutional 
distribution of powers and upon which the court can exercise its judicial authority. Or, 
as in the present context, it is power vested in the legislative or the executive branch, in 
which case the court cannot interfere. In other words, the principle of separation of 
powers does not only operate as a check on the exercise of legislative and executive 
powers it also serves as a restraint on the exercise of judicial authority. Justiciability, on 
the other hand, relates to the nature of the issue, the subject matter of the controversy 
which the court is called upon to adjudicate. For a court to enter into adjudication, the 
issue must be a “dispute” which “can be resolved by the application of the law”.19 
Otherwise, it might be caught by the doctrine of justiciability. 
3.1 Separation of powers issue 
Quite unlike the concepts of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law which 
are enacted as parts of the founding provisions of section 1,20 the term “separation of 
powers”, a long-standing constitutional concept,21 is nowhere mentioned in the 
Constitution, far less being defined. However, it is regarded as a necessary incident of a 
written constitution in which governmental powers and functions are distributed 
among the three organs of State: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is 
generally recognised as the foundation upon which the democratic edifice is 
constructed.22 Suffice it to say in the present context that “separation of powers” simply 
means, in the language of the United States Supreme Court in Springer v Government of 
the Philippine Islands,23 that “unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the 
powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive24 or judicial power;25 
                                                 
19 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). See also Mhango M 
“Is it time for a coherent political question doctrine in South Africa? Lessons from the United States” 
(2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 457 at 478. 
20 Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
21 See Laslett P (ed) Locke Two treatises of government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) 
chap XII; Cohler A M, Miller B C & Stone H S (eds) Montesquieu The spirit of the laws (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1989) chap 6; Bradley A & Ewing K Constitutional and administrative law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999). For a modern approach to the separation of powers doctrine in the 
British Constitution, see Okpaluba C “Judicial review of legislation in an unfamiliar constitutional 
environment: the United Kingdom experiment” (2006) 2 SAPR/PL 263. 
22 For a discussion of separation of powers in South Africa, see the SAAPIL case (2001); and De Lange v 
Smuts NO and others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC)(De Lange); Mhango (2014) at 457-494. 
23 See Springer v Government of the Philippine Islands 277 US 189 (1928) at para 201 (Springer); Meyers v 
US 272 US 52 (1926)(Meyers); Shoemaker v US 147 US 282 (1893)(Shoemaker ) at  paras 185-6. 
24 Springer involved a situation where the legislature purported to usurp the powers of the executive to 
make certain appointments. See also Governor of Kaduna State and others v Kagoma 1982 (3) NCLR 1032 
(HC); House of Assembly, Bendel State v Attorney General, Bendel State 1984 (5) NCLR 161 (SCN). 
25 See Police v Khoyratty 2004 (5) LRC 611 (Mau, SC); Ngoc Tri Chau v DPP (Cth) 132 ALR 430 (1995); S v 
Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schetekat 1999 (7) BCLR 771 (CC); S v Vries 1996 (12) BCLR 1666 
(Nm); Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC); DPP, 
Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC). 
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the executive cannot exercise either legislative26 or judicial power;27 the judiciary 
cannot exercise either executive28 or legislative power”.29 
The basic democratic principle involved in the context of SANRAL 1 is the doctrine 
of separation of powers which impels the judiciary from meddling in executive30 or 
legislative matters unless the intrusion was constitutionally mandated.31 It was held 
that the “harm and inconvenience to motorists” upon which the High Court relied as a 
ground for intervention, resulted from the decision of the national executive in the 
process of ordering of public resources, “over which the executive government disposes 
and for which it, and it alone, has the public responsibility. Thus, the duty of 
determining how public resources are to be drawn upon and reordered lies in the 
heartland of executive government function and domain”.32 Furthermore, the Court had 
to take into consideration the interests of the government and the extent to which the 
requested interdict would intrude on the executive terrain, particularly if it interfered 
with the allocation of public resources - a policy issue at the core of the executive 
domain. Such interference could only be warranted where the Court apprehends the 
presence of mala fides, fraud or corruption, otherwise, it must “examine carefully 
whether its order will trespass upon the terrain of another arm of government in a 
manner inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers”.33 By preventing 
SANRAL from performing its statutory duties, the High Court had meddled in fiscal 
affairs without considering the operation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The 
                                                 
26 The United States Supreme Court has long held that the principle of separation of powers excludes any 
extensive delegation of legislative power to the executive agencies. See Schechter Poultry Corporation v US 
205 US 495 (1935). See Justice Alliance  at paras 62-69. 
27 See Attorney General v Breckler 163 ALR 576 (1999)(HCA); J Astaphan & Co (1970) Ltd v Comptroller of 
Customs 1999 (2) LRC 569 (Dominica); De Lange. 
28 The Supreme Court of Nigeria held in Bronik Motors Ltd v Wema Bank Ltd 1983 (1) SCNLR 296 (Bronik 
Motors) at para 356 that the vesting of judicial power in the courts precludes them from being conferred 
with non-judicial functions. 
29 See Bronik Motors at para 3.1.1. 
30 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA) at para 48 held that 
where the intention to expropriate had not materialised, an intervention by a court to compel the 
expropriating authority to make a decision would be tantamount to trespassing the boundaries 
constituted by the separation of powers into the terrain of the executive. See also Pikoli v President, 
Republic of South Africa 2010 (1) SA 400 (GNP) at 409A-H, Du Plessis J holding that making the order 
would not be in breach of the separation of powers doctrine.  
31 Davis J had held in Mazibuko v Sisulu 2013 (4) SA 243 (WCC) (Mazibuko 1) at 256E-H and 259I that, 
while the judiciary is entitled to direct parliament to operate within its constitutional boundaries, it may 
not trespass unto the legislative terrain by dictating to parliament as to how to arrange its order of 
business, that is, how to organise its internal affairs. But see Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another 2013 (6) 249 
(CC) where the majority held that the Rules of the Assembly were defective, and (Jafta J minority opinion) 
at para 83 (noting that political issues must be resolved at a political level; that our court should not be 
drawn into political disputes, the resolution of which falls appropriately within the domain of other fora 
established in terms of the Constitution); and Mhango M “Separation of powers in Ghana: the evolution of 
the political question doctrine” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2703 at 2704. 
32 SANRAL 1 at para 67. 
33 SANRAL 1 at para 71. 
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Court had also ignored the substantial financial harm the interdict would cause the 
government. In effect, the High Court’s  
[D]eafening silence on the overarching consideration of separation of powers, taken 
together with other factors that go to where the balance of convenience rests, entitles this 
court to intervene. It should have held that the prejudice that will confront motorists in 
Gauteng if the interim interdict is not granted does not exceed the prejudice that the 
national executive government, National Treasury and SANRAL will have to endure, 
should the temporary restraining order be granted.34 
The courts are wary of the use of judicial remedial powers as an instrument to frustrate 
the executive authority of the President.35 For instance, the Court reiterated what it had 
said earlier in National Coalition36 and in its subsequent judgment in the highly 
politically charged floor-crossing litigation case of UDM v President of RSA (1).37 The 
Court was considering what a just and equitable remedy would be in a case where the 
interim orders made by the trial court intruded into the field reserved by the 
Constitution for the legislature. This meant that local government councillors were not 
able to take advantage of an amendment to the legislation held to be valid by the trial 
court and unless the Court reversed those orders, the effect of the Court proceedings 
would have frustrated the will of Parliament and rendered nugatory the provisions of 
item 7 of Schedule 6A of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court therefore made an 
order which would lift the apparent suspension imposed by the trial court orders by 
restoring the 15-day window period to enable those councillors interested in floor-
crossing to do so within the period specified in the judgment. Indeed, in the third of the 
three judgments delivered by the Court concerning the same parties - President of RSA v 
UDM38 - in considering the issue of interim relief, the Court stated:  
Having regard to the importance of the legislature in a democracy and the deference to 
which it is entitled from the other branches of government, it would not be in the 
interests of justice for a court to interfere with its will unless it is absolutely necessary to 
avoid likely irreparable harm and then only in the least intrusive manner possible with 
due regard to the interests of others who might be affected by the impugned legislation. 
Where the legislation amends and has thus achieved the special support required by the 
Constitution, courts should be all-the-more astute not to thwart the will of the 
legislature save in extreme cases. 
 
 
                                                 
34 SANRAL 1 at para 72. 
35 In similar vein, the court frowns on any conduct of the executive which is designed to frustrate the 
judiciary in performing its function. See Gauteng Gambling Board v MEC for Economic Development, 
Gauteng 2013 (5) SA 24 (SCA) at paras 52-54, holding that the State had a duty not to frustrate the courts 
in their enforcement of constitutional rights. 
36 See National Coalition at para 61 where it cautioned that deference to the legislature and restraint were 
called for in order to avoid the Court engaging in lawmaking.   
37 See UDM v President of RSA (1) 2002 (11) BCLR 1179 (CC) at para 116. 
38 See Republic of South Africa and Others v UDM 2002 (11) BCLR 1164 (CC) at para 31.  
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 21 (2017) 
 
Page | 9  
 
3.1.1 Analogy with the remedies of Severance and Reading In  
The problem of determining the “appropriate relief” to be granted or the “just and 
equitable”39 order the court should make that would not interfere with the principles of 
separation of powers is not restricted to the consideration of granting interim relief. It 
also relates to structural interdicts as well as the interpretative relief of reading in or 
severance among other judicial review remedies in the armoury of the courts. The 
courts always emphasise that they cannot in the guise of constitutional interpretation or 
in the exercise of their judicial review power take over the law-making function. Take 
the courts’ resistance in this regard whenever they are persuaded to read down statutes 
that ordinarily contravene the provisions of the Constitution in such a manner as to 
save them from unconstitutionality. For instance, in Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs,40 
the Namibian Supreme Court refused to read down provisions of an over-inclusive 
police regulations so that the phrase “comment in public upon the administration of the 
force” should be “amputated” to preserve the protectable core by inserting after the 
word “force” the following: “in a manner calculated to prejudice discipline within the 
force”. The Court construed this as an invitation to legislate which was within the 
constitutional domain of Parliament.41 However, this is contrary to the attitude of the 
Constitutional Court in subsequent cases where it has actually read in words in under-
inclusive statutes so as to render them constitutional.42 But even in these instances the 
Court was mindful of the principle of separation of powers in its exercise of its 
constitutional mandate under section 172(1)(b) which empowers it to make any order 
that is “just and equitable” where a law or conduct was found to be inconsistent with 
the Constitution.43  
Severance involves the excision of over-inclusive provisions in circumstances 
where the impugned legislation is not wholly unconstitutional but only partly so and 
there would be no need to strike down the entire statute.44 On the other hand, reading 
in contemplates an insertion of words which ought to have been embodied in the 
enactment in the first instance.45 The logic of the co-existence of these two remedies is 
that if the court can delete from a statute that part which renders it invalid without 
                                                 
39 The two expressions were discussed in detail in Okpaluba C “Extraordinary remedies for breach of 
fundamental rights: recent developments” (2002) 17 SA Public Law 98 at 102 & 124, respectively.  
40 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (4) SA 965 (Nm SC) at 987E-F. 
41 See Coetzee v Government of the RSA 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) at para 31; Case and another v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) at para 76; Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of SA 
1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para 32; S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) at para 
80. 
42 See National Coalition at para 67 and 74; S v Manamela 2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC). 
43 Article 25(3) of the Namibian Constitution 1990 which deals with remedies for infringement of 
fundamental rights speaks of “such orders as shall be necessary and appropriate”. 
44 See Okpaluba C “Judicial attitude towards the unconstitutionality of legislation: a Commonwealth 
perspective (part II)” (2000) 15 SAPR/PL 439.  
45 See Okpaluba C “Of ‘forging new tools’ and ‘shaping innovative remedies’: unconstitutionality of 
legislation infringing fundamental rights arising from legislative omissions in the new South Africa” 
(2001) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 469. 
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transgressing into the legislative province or interfering with the scheme of the 
legislation, then, it should be possible also to introduce into the legislation those words 
the absence of which would render the law invalid. Both techniques involve alteration 
of legislation.46 Through both remedies editorial amendments are made by the courts to 
legislation. The rationale for the availability of reading in as a remedy for a fundamental 
right breach was laid down in Schachter v Canada47 and Ackermann J in the National 
Coalition case.48  
 The emphasis which the court places on the remedies of reading in and 
severance is, as always, whether the remedy is less intrusive, and the same 
consideration pervades in respect of structural interdicts. It however remains 
debatable, at any rate jurisprudentially, whether the remedy of reading in words 
perceived by the court to have been omitted from the impugned legislation, which 
omission would render the legislation unconstitutional, does not in itself amount to 
judicial interference with the law-making powers of the legislature. Recognising the 
“suspicion” that the actual act of re-writing or editing legislation may constitute a 
possible encroachment by the judiciary on the terrain of the legislature and, therefore, a 
violation of the separation of powers, Madlanga J counselled that “courts must resort to 
it sparingly”.49 Agreeing with Madlanga J, Mogoeng CJ pointed out in a subsequent case:  
Severability is appropriate only in circumstances where the removed portion of 
the legislation or section does not so amputate the affected provision as to 
paralyse it.  What remains must still be capable of effectively advancing the 
legislative vision. It must allow for the implementation of the purpose of the 
provision or legislation in question.  That part of the legislation … that is to remain 
after severance must not owe its life to the excised provision.  It must be so self-
standing as to be capable of meaningful and effective application even in the 
absence of the excised offending part.50  
However, the courts tend to find it not too intrusive because Parliament always has the 
opportunity of amending the statute.51     
In Premier, Limpopo v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature,52 the Court 
declared the North West Act unconstitutional in its entirety as it had in a previous 
                                                 
46 See the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tetreault-Gadoury v Canada 1991 (2) SCR 22 (the 
Tetreault-Gadoury and Miron v Trudel 1995 (124) DLR 4th 693 (SCC) (Miron both of which are discussed 
below.  See also R v Hess 1990 (2) SCR 906 (SCC). 
47 Schachter v Canada 1992 (93) DLR 4th 1 (SCC) at paras 12h-13b.  
48 National Coalition at paras 67-69. 
49 Gaertner v Minister of Finance 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) (Gaertner) at para 82. See also Bishop M 
“Remedies” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (Juta & Company 2008) at 
9-104-9-105.  
50 Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa 2015 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (Helen 
Suzman at para 109. 
51Gaertner at para 84; Johncom Media Investments Ltd v M and others 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) at para 40; C v 
Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC) at para 89. 
52 Premier, Limpopo v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature 2012 (4) SA 58 (CC) (Limpopo (2). 
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judgement53 declared the other provincial Acts purporting to authorise the provincial 
legislatures to manage their financial affairs. It rejected an application for severance 
because the argument for granting such relief in this case ran into several difficulties. 
The Court was of the view that “the textual surgery” it was asked to undertake was so 
fraught with complications that severance was “impracticable”.54 Apart from the 
vagueness of the request and sheer breadth of what the Court was asked to sever, it was 
also important to bear in mind that the granting of severance, as in the case of any other 
form of relief, should not infringe upon the doctrine of separation of powers, or lead to 
usurpation of the power of the legislature to legislate.55 Khampepe J held in The Teddy 
Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development56 that 
similar considerations apply in relation to reading in.57 The reading in must remedy the 
defect; it must interfere as little as possible with the legislation and must still give effect 
to the purpose of the legislation.58 Holding that neither severance nor reading in was 
appropriate in the circumstances of the case, the Court opted for a declaration that 
sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 were unconstitutional59 and that the declaration should be 
suspended for 18 months to allow Parliament to deal with the matter.60 
                                                 
53 Premier, Limpopo v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (1) 2011 (6) SA 396 (CC). 
54Limpopo (2) at para 23 (Khampepe J). See the extensive re-writing that took place in C and Others v 
Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng 2012 (2) SA 208 at paras 92-94 in the guise of 
reading in.  
55 Limpopo (2) at para 27. See also Malachi v Cape Dance Academy International (Pty) Ltd 2010 (6) SA 1 
(CC) at para 47; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Land and Agricultural Bank of SA 2000 (3) SA 626 (CC) at 
para 15; Case and another v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) at para 73. In considering 
whether the order made in Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 240 
(CC) was unconstitutional, the Court discussed the purposes of the constitutional remedies of reading in, 
reading down, severance and notional severance and held that they always took place within the context 
of separation of powers. In declining to confirm the High Court’s order of invalidity in relation to the 
appointment criteria of the head of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, the Constitutional 
Court reasoned: “Separation of powers requires that the Judiciary refrain from being unnecessarily 
prescriptive to both the Executive and Parliament …. The constitutionally compliant policy choices they 
make must be respected even if there are, in the opinion of the Judiciary, better options available”. Helen 
Suzman at para 75. 
56 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) (Teddy Bear Clinic).  
57 National Coalition at paras 67-68. 
58  Teddy Bear Clinic at para 106.  
59 Although neither severance nor reading in was in issue in J v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
2014 (2) SACR 1 (CC), it is noteworthy that s 50(2)(a) of the same Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 was declared unconstitutional and inconsistent with s 28(2) 
of the Constitution to the extent that it unjustifiably limited the right of child sex offenders to have their 
best interests considered of paramount importance. See also C and others v Department of Health and 
Social Development, Gauteng 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC) at para 27. 
60 See SA Liquor Traders Association v Gauteng Liquor Board 2009 (1) SA 565 (CC) at para 40 where the 
Court held that since the legislative purpose was not clear, it was impossible to determine what tailored 
order of invalidity, whether severance or reading in, would best serve the purpose of the legislation; 
hence a declaration of invalidity was the best order to make in the circumstances. Thus, in Minister of 
Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, WC v The Habitat Council 2014 (4) SA 
437 (CC) at para 25, where the Constitutional Court did not confirm the extensive reading ordered by the 
trial court with the consent of both the Minister and the other parties before it 2013 (6) SA 113 (WCC).    
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3.1.2 Structural Interdicts 
Structural interdicts gained prominence in constitutional adjudication in South Africa 
with the interpretation of the provisions entrenching socio-economic rights and the 
appropriate relief that could be ordered to enable the realisation of those rights since 
the judgments in Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and 
others61 and Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign.62 The question 
in the recent cases of Allpay (No 1)63 and Allpay (No 2)64 was completely different from 
those in the Grootboom/Treatment Action Campaign-type cases. In the Allpay cases, 
there was already in place, a national legislation which established the South African 
Social Security Administration (SASSA)65 as the national institution charged with the 
obligation of ensuring effective payments to the beneficiaries of the social security 
grants66 guaranteed to the indigent by the Constitution.67 To that extent, the 
Government had complied with the dictates of section 27(2) of the Constitution because 
it had taken legislative and other measures to ensure that the guaranteed right to social 
assistance was realised. The matter before Court, therefore, involved the administrative 
bungling with the procurement contract to disburse the social security benefits to the 
beneficiaries, and what appropriate and just and equitable order the Court should make 
to remedy the unconstitutionality without disrupting the flow of social security benefits 
to the needy, while at the same time leaving the administration of the system to the 
executive agency. In Allpay (No 1) the procurement process was declared 
unconstitutional while Allpay (No 2) was designed to fashion the appropriate relief to 
remedy the constitutional breach.  
In granting a number of structural interdicts and ordering a re-run of the tender 
process, the Constitutional Court raised accountability concerns centred on the modus 
operandi of SASSA. The level of competence or the absence thereof coupled with 
SASSA’s conduct manifested in its handling of the procurement process obviously 
impelled the Court in taking that line of action. SASSA did not live up to the tenets and 
basic values and principles governing public administration as laid down in section 195 
of the Constitution. Indeed, from the evidence emanating from the “merits” as well as 
the present “relief” judgments, the Court held that it was beyond doubt that it was 
“SASSA’s irregular conduct” that was “the sole cause of the declaration and the setting 
aside of the contract between it and Cash Paymaster”.68  In the light of the importance of 
the right to social security; the impact, on and potential prejudice to, a large number of 
beneficiaries; and the interest of the public in a properly re-run tender process, the 
                                                 
61 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)(Grootboom). 
62 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (Minister of Health No 2). 
63 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC)( Allpay No1)      
64 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) (Allpay No 2).  See also, Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] 
ZACC 8 
65 See South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. 
66 Section 4(2)(a) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
67 Sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
68 Allpay No2 at para 73. 
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court considered it “appropriate to impose a structural interdict requiring SASSA to 
report back to the court at each of the crucial stages of the new tender process”.  
It is difficult to conceive an argument that the interdicts issued in Allpay (No 2) 
were non-intrusive, in fact, in respect of the executive function. An argument to similar 
effect would also be unconvincing in respect of the structural interdicts in Minister of 
Health.69 Perhaps the intrusiveness or otherwise of an order of court with regard to the 
executive function in these circumstances could be measured by the extent to which the 
judicial ordering is permissible in law especially if the “just and equitable” catchphrase 
would seem to have guaranteed its constitutionality. 
Structural interdicts are not limited to the issues involving socio-economic rights. 
One such illustration is the controversial case of NDPP and others v Freedom Under 
Law.70 The question of the appropriate remedy to be granted arose after the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA) had affirmed the trial judge’s setting aside of the NDPP’s decision 
to withdraw the fraud and corruption charges against Lt General Mdluli of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS); the setting aside of the Police Commissioner’s decision to 
terminate the disciplinary proceedings against Mdluli; the reversal of the decision to 
withdraw the murder and related charges; and the decision of the Police Commissioner 
to reinstate Mdluli in his office. In addition to setting aside the four impugned decisions, 
the trial judge  granted mandatory interdicts to the effect that: (a) the NDPP should 
reinstate all the criminal charges against Mdluli, and to ensure that the prosecution of 
these charges were re-enrolled and pursued without delay; and (b) the Police 
Commissioner should reinstate the disciplinary proceedings against Mdluli and to take 
all steps necessary for the prosecution and finalization of these proceedings diligently 
and without delay.71  
The SCA held that these mandatory interdicts were an impermissible 
transgression of the doctrine of separation of powers because, in so ordering, the Court 
purported to assume the functions of the executive. In terms of the Constitution, the 
authority to prosecute is vested in the NDPP while the control and management of SAPS 
is the province of the Commissioner of SAPS, and the Court could only interfere with 
these constitutional arrangements on rare occasions and for compelling reasons. In the 
absence of this being a rare occasion or there being any compelling reason(s), the 
executive authorities should be given the opportunity to perform their constitutional 
mandates in a proper manner. The setting aside of the withdrawal of the criminal 
charges and the disciplinary proceedings would have had the effect of the charges and 
the proceedings being automatically reinstated and it was for the executive authorities 
                                                 
69 Minister of Health at para113. 
702014 (4) SA 298 (SCA) (NDPP). 
71 Freedom Under Law v NDPP and others 2014 (1) SA 254 (GNP) at para 241. 
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to deal with them. So, by issuing the mandatory orders, the trial court “went too far”.72 
In the final analysis the SCA set aside the said mandatory orders.73 
3.2 The justiciability angle to the debate 
The principle of judicial constraint on adjudication stems not only from the courts’ 
deference to the other arms of government on the separation of powers ground,74 it also 
derives from the doctrine of justiciability.75 The underlying theme is that judicial 
avoidance of those issues not properly suited for adjudication76 is required because 
such issues belong to the domain of the executive, the legislature or the political 
process.77 A dispute is not appropriate for adjudication and therefore not justiciable if it 
involves a “multiplicity of variable and interlocking factors, decision on each of which 
presupposes decisions on all the others,” the so-called polycentric disputes.78 It is 
therefore clear that where a decision will generally involve the application of 
                                                 
72 NDPPat para  51. 
73 The SCA had previously warned, in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von Abo 2011 (5) SA 
262 (SCA) at paras 29-31, that courts should be aware of making structural orders, that is, orders by 
which the court exercises some form of supervisory jurisdiction over an organ of State, since they tend to 
encroach on the functions of the executive, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers. 
74 In terms of this principle, the courts guard against any attempt by the executive branch to assign 
functions of a non-judicial character to serving judges – SAAPIL at para 897B-902A; City of Cape Town at 
paras 167-217; NSPCA v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 2013 (5) SA 571 (CC) at para 13.  
75 Lord MacDermott Protection from power under English law  (London: Stevens 1957) at 56; Nwabueze B 
O Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa the role of courts in government  (New York: St. Martin’s Press 
1977) at 20; Lockhart W B, Kamisar Y & Choper J H Constitutional rights and liberties: cases, comments, 
questions (West Publishing Company 1980) at 31; Marshall G “Justiciability” in Guest A G Oxford essays in 
jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961) at 265; Summers R S “Justiciability” (1963) 26 MLR 
530; Stone J “Non liquet and the function of law in the international community” (1959) 35 Br YBIL 124; 
Albert L A  “Justiciability and theories of judicial review, A remote relationship” (1977) 50 So Cal LR 1139 
at  1269; Lindell G “The justiciability of political questions: recent developments” in Lee H P & Winterton 
G Australian constitutional perspectives (Australia: The Law Book Company 1992) 180. 
76 See Okpaluba C “Justiciability and constitutional adjudication in the Commonwealth: the problem of 
definition (2003) 66 THRHR 424 & 610.   
77 See Okpaluba C “Justiciability, constitutional adjudication and the political question in a nascent 
democracy: South Africa (parts 1 and 2)” (2003) and (2004) 19 SAPR/PL 331 & 114, respectively; and 
Mhango (2014) at 480-486. 
78 This concept which originally derived from Polanyi M The logic of liberty: reflections and rejoinders 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1951) at 171 has been advanced by Stone J Social dimensions of law 
and justice (London: Stevens (1966) at 653; Fuller L L “The forms and limits of adjudication” (1978) 92 
Harv LR 353 at 395. See also the restraint of trade cases and the consideration of public interest by the 
courts: Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson 1968 (2) All ER 686 at 707D-708A (Lord 
Wilberforce); Texaco v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd 1972 (1) All ER 513 at 527a-f, per Ungoed-Thomas J; 
per Lord Scarman, agreeing with Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal in Lim Poh Choo v Camden and 
Islington Area Housing Authority 1979 (2) All ER 910 at 913j-914a-d. See Kobatschenko v King NO and 
another 2001 (4) SA 336 (CPD) at 353D-H where counsel having framed his submissions in line with 
Fuller’s proposition, urged the court to be wary of disputes that may be analytically unsuited to resolution 
by an all-or-nothing suit between two parties, because they usually concern a large number of possible 
configurations of interests and intersections between them; and Mhango (2014) at 472. 
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government79 or departmental policy,80 the balancing of competing claims on the purse 
and the allocation of economic resources,81 or where the court has no manageable 
standards by which to judge the issue82 the court would, in simple terms, be “in a 
judicial no man’s land”.83  
However, in the constitutional scheme of things, the court remains the ultimate 
guardian of the Constitution and has the obligation to ensure through the principle of 
legality that the exercise of power by the other branches of government occurred within 
the bounds of their constitutional authorities.84 It is fair to state in the present context 
that the problem of justiciability arises where the court finds that its judicial authority 
cannot be exercised because the subject matter of the proceeding is not amenable to the 
judicial process in one or more of the following circumstances. First, where a dispute 
raises political questions, which are not appropriate for judicial resolution.85 When a 
                                                 
79 Lord Diplock in Council of the Civil Service Union v Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) All ER 935 at 
951. See also Swissbourgh Diamond Mines v Government of the RSA [1998] JOL 4144 (T) (holding that the 
act of State doctrine is applicable South Africa as it is in the United States; and that the judicial branch of 
government ought to be astute in not venturing into areas where it would be in a judicial no man’s land). 
80 Where, as in MEC for Environmental Affairs and Development Planning v Clarinson’s CC 2013 (6) SA 235 
(SCA) at paras 18 & 30-32, the refusal by the political head of the department in accordance with 
departmental policy of an application to develop a piece of land was challenged on the ground of 
perceived bias. The SCA held that when the law entrusted a functionary with a discretion, the law gave 
recognition to the evaluation made by the functionary to whom the discretion was entrusted. It was not 
open to a court to second-guess his or her evaluation. When exercising a discretion on a matter governed 
by policy, the law requiries the functionary to bring an open mind to bear on the matter, but that is not 
the same as a mind that was untrammelled by existing principles or policy.                                           
81 Neill LJ in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board and another, ex parte P and another 1995 (1) All ER 
870 at 881h.  
82 Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962). 
83 Lord Wilberforce in Occidental Petroleum Corp v Buttes Gas & Oil 1981 (3) All ER 616 at 633. 
84 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1)  SA 566 (CC); Merafong Demarcation Forum 
and others v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC); Von Abo v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2009 (5) SA 345 (CC); Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
and others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC); Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 
2012 (1) SA 417 (SCA); Minister of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs, KZN v Umlambo 
Trading 29 CC and others 2008 (1) SA 396 (SCA); Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA); Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2012 (1) SA 417 (SCA), confirmed Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
85 For instance, in Democratic Alliance v Ethekwini Municipality 2012 (2) SA 151 (SCA) at paras 19 & 38 - a 
case involving a politically motivated decision to change street names for which the council was 
accountable politically - the SCA considered whether the decisions of the council complied with the 
principles of legality and rationality within the context of Fedsure Life Insurance v City of Johannesburg 
Transitional Municipal Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para 56; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of SA and another: in re Ex parte President of the RSA and others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 85 and 
Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) at paras 74-75. 
It held that the determination of which streets should be renamed, and the new names chosen, ‘admits of 
no right answer and is inherently political.’ Accordingly, it was not for the SCA or any other court in the 
land to interfere in the politically motivated decisions taken by a deliberative assembly of the council in 
the exercise of its direct authority, with its origin in the Constitution. For more discussion on this subject, 
see Mhango (2014). 
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matter is said not to be suitable for adjudication because it raises a political question, it 
is not the same thing as saying that a matter has political implications or overtones or 
consequences. It only means that the issue cannot be resolved by the application of the 
law. On the other hand, once a matter comes to court and there is a constitutional or 
legal basis for the action, such as a claim that has ascertainable constitutional or 
statutory basis, such a matter ceases to be political notwithstanding its political flavour, 
consequences or outcome. In such circumstances, a party or indeed a judge cannot, 
through his or her personal views or convictions, convert a potentially constitutional 
matter into a political question even if it arises from an apparent administrative 
bungling by a Department of State.  
For instance, there is a judgment of the High Court in Section 27 and others v 
Minister of Education and another86 that the provision of textbooks in schools was an 
essential component of the constitutional right to a basic education guaranteed in 
section 29(1) of the Constitution and that respondent’s failure to comply with their duty 
in this regard even by mid-academic year would prima facie constitute a violation of this 
right. Notwithstanding that this judgment has not been overturned by a higher court 
and is therefore the law in present day South Africa, there was the melodrama that was 
reported to have taken place in the North Gauteng High Court.87 The “worrying” 
development concerned the utterances of a judge during proceedings in court on the 
same textbook saga in Limpopo Province. The judge had suggested to the parties before 
him that instead of coming to court, they should have approached the Democratic 
Alliance or the Economic Freedom Fighters for help or just written to the provincial 
Department of Education. In the course of the proceeding, the judge was quoted as 
saying: 
  
It’s likely that opposition politicians would be more interested in raising these matters 
than government politicians …. So wouldn’t that be a course open to you? Would Mr 
[Julius] Malema or Mrs [Helen] Zille not be interested in your submissions …. I don’t see 
why [coming to court] is appropriate.88  
One cannot find any better illustration of a Judge descending into the arena of politics 
than the foregoing speech. The judge thereby went off the mark in jurisprudential 
parlance. Surprisingly, in the judgment handed down following the proceedings in Basic 
Education for All and others v Minister of Basic Education and others,89 where Tuchten J 
made the said objectionable observations, he did not decline jurisdiction in the matter 
for lack of a justiciable issue or because it raised a political issue. There was no mention 
of the political nature of the dispute throughout the judgment. Rather, there was a clear 
indication that there was after all a dispute before the court that needed to be resolved 
by the application of the law. This is evidenced by the Court’s declaration that the non-
                                                 
86 2013 (2) SA 40 (GNP) at para 32.      
87 “Education” Mail & Guardian 14 April -1 May 2014 at 9. 
88 “Education” Mail & Guardian, 25 April – 1 May 2014 at 9. 
89 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 (4) SA 274 (GNP) at para 82.2. 
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delivery to the learners of some of the textbooks prescribed for their grades in the 2014 
academic year before the teaching of the curricula for which the textbooks were 
prescribed was due to commence was a violation by the Department of Basic Education 
of the learners’ rights to a basic education in terms of sections 29(1)(a), their right to 
equality under section 9 and dignity in section 10, of the Constitution.90 Surely, the 
judge’s outburst that the parties in court should have turned to the politicians was 
totally unwarranted and judicially out of line.  
Second, where the court is called upon to make pronouncements that may fly by 
the wind since there is no legal source upon which such pronouncements will be based 
or no person against whom the orders of the court will be made. The Constitutional 
Court judgment in Marikana 1, which has already been discussed in this article, is 
authority for so asserting.91 Third, where the case brought to court involves complicated 
economic, social or financial factors that may prove impossible for the court to untie, 
again because the matter has been improperly brought to court instead of it being kept 
within the executive realm.92 Fourth, where the party seeking the intervention of the 
court initiates proceedings with indecent haste before the cause of complaint has clearly 
manifested, crystallised or matured.93 
Fifth, where the subject matter for determination has become extinct, redundant, 
moot,94 irrelevant or hypothetical. But, as the Court explained in Van Wyk v Unitas 
Hospital95 it is now axiomatic that mootness did not constitute an absolute bar to the 
justiciability of an issue as the court has the discretion whether or not to hear a matter. 
The determining factor is what is in the interests of justice and this includes the 
consideration whether the order the court may make would have any practical effect 
either on the parties or on others. However, mootness would assume particular 
significance in a case where there was an inordinate delay and in the absence of a 
reasonable explanation for such delay.96 On the other hand, a matter is hypothetical if it 
raises purely academic or abstract question(s) whereby the court is called upon to 
engage in theorising in the absence of a controversy or dispute between the parties. 
Courts do not appreciate such calls; they prefer to spend their time and scarce resources 
on matters properly before them which will involve an application or interpretation of 
                                                 
90 Goosen J held in Madzodzo obo Parents of Learners at Mpimbo Junior Secondary School v Minister of 
Basic Education 2014 (2) All SA 339 (ECM) at paras 19-20 that the State’s obligation to provide basic 
education as guaranteed by s 29(1)(a) of the Constitution is not confined to making places available at 
schools but requires a range of educational resources – schools, classrooms, teachers, teaching materials 
and appropriate facilities for learners; access to schools; non-teaching staff and the provision of adequate 
teaching resources. 
91 See text at n 12. 
92 Scaw; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); UDM v President of RSA 
(1) 2002 (11) BCLR 1164 (CC). 
93 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) SA 997 (T). 
94 President, Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institute 1999 (4) SA 682 (CC); IEC v 
Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC).                               
95 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC) (Van Wyk at para 29. 
96 Van Wyk at para 30. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUSTICIABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Page | 18  
 
the law. This was the attitude of the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin NO and 
others97 as applied recently in Savoi and others v NDPP and another98 where it was 
stated that although the applicants plainly had standing to challenge the provisions of 
section 2(1) of the Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 as invalid, void for vagueness and 
being over-broad, that did not make it irrelevant that the challenge was brought in the 
abstract. Courts generally treat abstract challenges with disfavour, because they ask 
them to peer into the future, and in doing so, they stretch the limits of judicial 
competence. 
Sixthly, the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies or internal 
procedures.99 The rule of exhausting internal remedies has exceptions. The 
Constitutional Court made it clear in Ramakatsa and others v Magashule and others,100 
that a court will not uphold that plea where: (a) various irregularities pointed out by the 
appellants to the Free State branch of the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) of the 
African National Congress (ANC) had occurred in the branch processes aimed at electing 
delegates to attend the then impending party’s National Congress had gone unattended; 
(b) the Secretary-General had already said that the ANC would do nothing more about 
the matter; (c) the National Executive Council of the ANC had already endorsed the PEC 
and the proceedings of the Provincial Committee; and (d) there was thus no other 
internal remedy left to the appellants. The majority of the Constitutional Court held that 
the High Court was wrong to have refused to hear the merits of the application on this 
procedural ground. It held that failure to hear the merits of the dispute between the 
parties seriously compromised the appellants’ right to have a justiciable dispute 
determined in a fair public hearing before a court. The underlying justiciable dispute 
was whether the PEC was properly elected. In the words of Yacoob J at para 27 “that 
dispute was never heard let alone unfairly heard. And, what is more, not heard on 
unsustainable grounds. The High Court ought to have heard the merits of the dispute.” 
The majority accordingly declared the provincial elective conference of the ANC and the 
decisions taken at the conference unlawful and void.  
Finally, where the wrong party initiates proceedings of which the outcome would 
be of no benefit to him or her,101 or indeed, anyone else. Thus, the Constitutional Court 
held in Stuttafords Stores (Pty) Ltd v Salt of the Earth Creations (Pty) Ltd, 102 that if it 
determined the recusal dispute in the case, it would have no practical effect on the 
                                                 
97 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at paras 162 & 165.    
982014 (1) SACR 545 (CC) at paras 9-13. 
99 See s 7(2)(a) PAJA; Marais v Democratic Alliance 2002 (2) BCLR 171 (C); Cronje v Unted Cricket Board of 
SA 2001 (4) SA 1361 (T); Pennington v Friedgood 2002 (1) SA 251 (C). See also ss 79 and 121 of the 
Constitution on the referrals of the constitutionality of Bills by the President and Premiers – 
Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill, 2000 [2001] ZACC 10; 2002 (1) SA 447 (CC); 2001 (11) 
BCLR 1126 at paras 9-11; and Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa In re: Constitutionality of 
the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).        
1002013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC) at paras 27-28 & 124. 
101 See Tulip Diamonds FZE v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 (5) SACR 443 (CC); 
Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC). 
102 2011 (1) SA 267 (CC) at para 8. 
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material issues between the parties. 103 It was not in the interests of justice to grant 
leave to appeal against the refusal of the judge in the court a quo to recuse himself, 
where the judge had subsequently retired and would not be hearing any further 
proceedings between the parties.  
It has also been demonstrated that most of these obstacles to judicial review are 
judge-made although the courts have often found a justification by way of interpreting 
the provisions of the Constitution or statute as authorizing or mandating them to arrive 
at such conclusions. In other instances, the Constitution has in itself set the limits for 
justiciability by delineating the scope of judicial power,104 or by outright demarcation of 
the jurisdiction of the court,105 or by creating inchoate obligations on the State, or by 
making the language of a provision absolutely or expressly unenforceable.106 Or, as in 
the case of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, by employing words that would 
not convey forthright or outright judicial enforcement of the rights107, such as, 
conferring on the individual the “right of access to” and making the right realisable 
“within available resources”. This, in turn, makes it imperative for the court to go 
beyond the law and investigate whether government policy was reasonable or 
justifiable in the realisation of the rights entrenched.108 In simple terms, a matter is 
justiciable when the court can lawfully enter into adjudication in light of its jurisdiction, 
                                                 
103 See also Van Wyk at para 29; IEC v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) at para 9; JT Publishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 514 (CC) at para 17. 
104 This anomalous provision has been present in the Nigerian Constitutions of 1979 and 1999 and was 
ostensibly designed to protect the Military Regimes that crafted these Constitutions ostensibly from 
criminal prosecutions and political recriminations that might arise out of the laws they passed and 
actions taken when they were in office.  
105 See eg the special jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in s 167(4)(e) of the Constitution which vests 
in it the power to “decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation”. 
See further Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) 
(Doctors); Von Abo v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (5) SA 345 (CC). 
106 Take the example of the unenforceable political charters in the form of Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitutions of India 1947-48 (ss 36-51); Lesotho 1993 (chap 
III); Namibia 1990 (chap 11); Nigeria 1979; 1999 (chap 2). See also New Patriotic Party v Attorney General 
1997 SCGLR 729 where the Supreme Court of Ghana held that the Directive Principles under chap 6 of the 
Constitution of Ghana 1992, are in general not justiciable except when read with other justiciable 
provisions of the Constitution; and Mhango “Separation of powers in Ghana” (2014) at 2726-2733 for a 
deeper discussion of the directive principles under the Constitution of Ghana. However, see Ghana Lotto 
Operators Association v National Lottery Authority 2007-2008 SCGLR 1088 where, in relation to the 
directive principles under chap 6 of the Constitution of Ghana 1992, Justice Date-Bah held that “there may 
be particular provisions in chapter 6 which do not lend themselves to enforcement by a court. The very 
nature of such a particular provision would rebut the presumption of justiciability in relation to it. In the 
absence of a demonstration that a particular provision does not lend itself to enforcement by courts, 
however, the enforcement by this court of the obligations imposed in chapter 6 should be insisted upon 
and would be a way of deepening our democracy and the liberty under law that it entails...This court will 
need to be flexible and imaginative in determining how the provisions of chapter 6 are to be enforceable;”  
107 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para 36; Grootboom at paras 
24 & 38. 
108 Grootboom; Minister of Health No 2; Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC); City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (City 
of Johannesburg).  
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the subject matter of the complaint, the parties before court, and the nature of the relief 
sought. 
3.2.1 Executive policy formulation109 
The term “policy” or “government policy” refers to a proposal or viewpoint of 
government on a subject matter that underlies a law already enacted or to be enacted. It 
sometimes stands for the purpose for taking a particular line of action, such as, the 
reason for taking a particular decision, enacting a law or initiating a measure. As far as 
legal principles or understanding goes, once a policy is translated into an enactment, it 
ceases to be in the realm of policy and steps up into being law. The enactment becomes 
a source of right(s) or obligation(s). At this stage, what was policy has transformed into 
a justiciable matter capable of being binding on the parties and subject to judicial 
interpretation and powers of review. And, as Harms JA said, laws, regulations and rules 
are legislative instruments whereas policy determinations are not; and further:  
As a matter of sound government, in order to bind the public, policy should normally be 
reflected in such instruments. Policy determinations cannot override, amend or be in 
conflict with laws. Otherwise the separation between legislature and executive will 
disappear.110  
But when it is still in the pipeline such as going through the stages of a parliamentary 
bill, it is not law, hence unenforceable and not justiciable.111 The boundaries of law and 
policy as regards the implementation of administrative functions and the exercise of 
statutory discretions, are in this genre of the policy for the purposes of this 
discussion.112 Similarly, policy encountered in the operational/policy dichotomy debate 
in the law of bureaucratic negligence is another species of this meaning of policy. When 
it is said in this context that the public authority was implementing policy and was not 
acting in operational capacity the court was expressing 
[T]he need to exclude altogether those cases in which the decision under attack is of a 
kind that a question whether it has been made negligently is unsuitable for judicial 
resolution, of which notable examples are discretionary decisions on the allocation of 
                                                 
109 While considering whether the conduct of the Director General in closing the Refugee Reception Office 
in Cape Town was an administrative action in Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 2013 (6) SA 421 
(SCA) at para 58, Nugent JA held that whether such an office was necessary for achieving the purpose of 
the Act was “quintessentially one of policy.”    
110 Akani Garden Route (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Casino (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 501 (SCA) (Akani at para 7. 
111 The three different stages which a Bill passes through in Parliament and the relative legal status of the 
Bill at each stage were analysed in Doctors at paras 57-58, 60, 63-65 & 71.     
112 On the question, whether government policy is justiciable, see Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Education, EC v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) (the school subsidy case); Minister of 
Education v Harris 2001 (11) BCLR 289 (CC) (ministerial age prescription case) and the government 
policy in the Nevirapine affair – Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 703 
(CC); Minister of Health (health care policy to provide nevirapine); City of Johannesburg (municipality’s 
policy to provide accommodation to persons it evicted from “bad buildings”). See also the school 
pregnancy policy cases: HOD, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (2) SA 415 
(CC); HOD, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2014 (2) SA 228 (CC). 
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scarce resources or the distribution of risks….113 If this is right, classification of the 
relevant decision as a policy or planning decision in this sense may exclude liability; but a 
conclusion that it does not fall within that category does not, in their Lordships’ opinion, 
mean that a duty of care will necessarily exist.114  
A classical illustration of a situation where the court was confronted with executive 
policy formulation was in Scaw where the Constitutional Court reiterated the limits of 
judicial ordering given the facts of that case. The order of the High Court had restrained 
two members of the Cabinet from exercising executive powers vested in them by both 
the Constitution and national legislation. In terms of sections 85(2)(a), (b) and (e) of the 
Constitution, the President together with members of the Cabinet are empowered to 
exercise executive authority, inter alia, by: (a) implementing national legislation; (b) 
developing and implementing policy: and (c) performing any other executive function in 
terms of the Constitution or national legislation. Again, the International Trade 
Administration Act 2002115 and the Board on Tariffs and of Trade Act 1986116 required 
the relevant Ministers to formulate and implement national policy and to perform 
specified executive functions in relation to the import and export of goods and other 
international trade activities. In particular, they were required by these laws to impose, 
change and remove anti-dumping duties in order to realise the primary economic and 
developmental objects of the statutes.117 In its judgment in Scaw, the Constitutional 
Court considered a number of points relating to whether it was in the interest of justice 
to entertain an appeal against a temporary order;118 whether an interim interdict was 
appealable;119 whether it was appropriate for the High Court to have granted the 
interim interdict;120 and the application of the doctrine of separation of powers in this 
type of case. 121 The Court held that the restraining order brought to the fore the 
important question of separation of powers between the courts and the executive and 
the potential breach of the State’s international obligations in relation to international 
trade. It was held: 
The setting, changing or removal of an anti-dumping duty is a policy-laden executive 
decision that flows from the power to formulate and implement domestic and 
international trade policy. That power resides in the heartland of national executive 
authority.”122  
Therefore, the interdict granted by the trial court clearly amounted to an unwarranted 
intrusion into the formulation and implementation of international trade policy, matters 
                                                 
113 Craig P Administrative Law 5 ed (India: Satyam Books 2007) at 534-538. 
114 Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd 1988 (1) All ER 163 at 172.  
115 International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. 
116 Act 107 of 1986. 
117 Scaw at para 42. 
118 Scaw case at para 41. 
119 Scaw at paras 46-59. 
120 Scaw at paras 68-89 
121 Scaw at paras 90-111. 
122 Scaw at para 44. 
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that resided squarely within the executive domain. It was set aside for being in breach 
of the doctrine of separation of powers.123 
It was held that since the interdict granted by the trial court had the effect of 
curtailing executive power to formulate and implement trade policy, and also caused 
the applicant irreparable harm by maintaining anti-dumping duties which would 
otherwise have ended, leave to appeal had to be granted even though the interdict was 
characterised as being of an interim nature.124 More importantly, it was held that courts 
should observe the constitutional limits of their powers and refrain from making 
decisions reserved for other branches of government.125 For instance, a court should be 
slow to override mandatory legislative provisions buttressed by international 
obligations.126 If a specific power or function – such as the extension of a legislatively 
determined anti-dumping duty – was validly entrusted to the executive, courts should 
resist the temptation to usurp it, especially if the determination in question was, as in 
the present case, policy-laden and polycentric.127  
3.2.2 Allocation of resources 
So, when the High Court dismissed the application of a class of Marikana mineworkers 
for temporary relief on the refusal of the government to bear the financial costs for their 
legal representation at the then on going Marikana Commission of Inquiry 
(Commission), they approached the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal urgently 
and directly. They sought urgent temporary relief to the effect that the President, the 
Minister of Justice and the Legal Aid Board, must provide and ensure legal aid to them at 
State expense to enable them to participate in the Commission’s proceedings 
                                                 
123 Scaw at para 111. See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); Van Rooyen and others v The State and others 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC); Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 
(CC); Doctors. 
124 Scaw at paras 42-45 & 56-61 (Moseneke DCJ).  
125 Oriani-Ambrosini MP v Sisulu MP, Speaker of the National Assembly 2012 (6) SA 588 (CC) at para 84 
held that it is not for the courts to dictate to the National Assembly “how it should go about regulating its 
own business”.  See also, Mhango “Separation of Powers in Ghana” (2014) (discussing how the Supreme 
Court in Ghana has developed a political question doctrine to restrain itself from making decisions 
reserved for other branches of government; and calling on the Constitutional Court to develop a coherent 
political question doctrine to enable it to jurisprudentially refrain from usurping the powers of other 
branches of State). 
126 The Scaw case (2012) at para 87. For this same reason, two unreported High Court judgments were 
overruled for being inconsistent with the principles articulated in the present case - African Explosives Ltd 
v ITAC and others Case No 15027/2006, 5 August 2008 (GNP); Algorax (Pty) Ltd v ITAC and others Case No 
25233/05, 10 September 2005.   
127 Scaw at para 95. The doctrine of separation of powers does not necessarily stand between the court 
and judicial review of legislative acts or processes if the subject of challenge is regulated by law. This is 
the difference between the traditional common law non-interventionist approach where the courts tend 
to refrain from interfering in the legislative process as represented by the trial court and minority 
judgments on the one hand, and the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court, on the other, in 
Mazibuko 2 case (2013) where the court based its intervention on the defect inherent in the Rules of the 
National Assembly in what, the traditionalists would describe as an internal affair of the legislature.  See 
also, Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP). 
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established by the President to investigate and report on “matters of public, national 
and international concern arising out of the tragic incidents at the Lonmin Mine in 
Marikana”.128 In rejecting the application, Raulinga J referred to the principles discussed 
above and held: 
Although in this case, the court dealt with a temporary restraining order, the principle is 
the same. I need therefore to ask myself not only whether an interim interdict against an 
authorised state functionary is competent, but rather whether it is constitutionally 
appropriate to grant the interdict. The funds allocated to the second and third 
respondents is a result of an executive decision about ordering of public resources, over 
which the government disposes and for which it, and it alone has the public 
responsibility. The duty of determining how public resources are to be drawn upon and 
reordered lies in the heartland of executive government function domain. I can only 
grant such an order if there is proof of unlawfulness or fraud or corruption. I do not find 
any in this case. Therefore, I will not interfere with the power and the prerogative to 
formulate and implement policy on how to finance public projects and even how the 
applicants must be funded.129    
The Constitutional Court upheld the judge’s approach as “prudent and appropriate”.130 
It held that since there was indeed no claim of fraud or corruption, the High Court’s 
finding that there was no unlawfulness, was “a conclusion that must be treated with 
deference in an appeal against an interim order”.131 In considering the High Court’s 
finding that the respondents’ refusal to provide legal aid to the applicants did not justify 
the granting of the interim relief they sought and without appearing to be anticipating 
the outcome of the main review application and the final relief sought,132 the Court 
stated the three provisions (sections 28(1)(h); 35(2)(c ); and 35(3)(g)) in the Bill of 
Rights which explicitly entitle anyone to claim legal representation at State expense.  
It was held that none of these provisions applied to the circumstances of the 
Marikana mineworkers because: they were neither children nor detained or accused 
persons, and that the proceedings of the Commission were neither civil nor criminal 
trials.133 The reliance on other provisions of the Bill of Rights to support their claim for 
state funded legal representation on grounds of alleged infringements of their rights of 
access to court;134 equality rights135 and general considerations of fairness were 
rejected by the Court as not warranting its intervention in the order of the trial judge.136 
There was no doubt that it would have “been commendable and fairer” had the 
                                                 
128 See Proclamation 50 of 2012 in GG 35680 of 12 September 2012. 
129 Magidiwana and another v President of the Republic of South Africa and others [2013] ZAGPPHC 220; 
[2014] 1 All SA 61 (GNP) at para 44. 
130 Marikana 1 at  para 10. 
131 Marikana 1. 
132 Marikana 1 at para 11. 
133 Marikana 1 at para 12 
134 Constitution s 34. 
135 Constitution s 9. 
136 Marikana 1 at para 13. 
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applicants been afforded legal representation at State expense given that State organs, 
such as the SAPS, were given such privileges and the mining corporations were able to 
afford “the huge legal fees involved”, yet the power to appoint a commission of inquiry 
is the constitutional prerogative of the President.137 Although the search for truth is 
always the reason to establish a commission of inquiry and as much as it is always in the 
interest of the entire nation that such truth be established, unfairness might however 
occur where adequate legal representation was not afforded. In spite of the fact that the 
absence of a fair opportunity in terms of legal representation may compromise the 
essence of establishing a Commission, the courts do not have the power to order the 
executive branch of government on how to deploy State resources.138 
4 CONCLUSION 
The ratio of the Constitutional Court’s judgments in SANRAL 1 and Marikana 1 can be 
put simply: the Constitutional Court as an apex court, is reluctant to entertain appeals 
on interim relief where its order(s) would infringe the doctrine of separation of powers 
by constituting an unwarranted intrusion into the formulation or implementation of 
government policy; or by practically frustrating the executive authority of government. 
It could be argued that the reason for that conclusion in Marikana 1 is the lack of a 
proper identification by the applicant of the legal framework on which the right claimed 
could be based and the absence of the appropriate respondent against whom an order 
of court could be made. Although mention was made of separation of powers and 
allocation of government financial resources, that was, it is submitted, by way of 
explanation.  
On the other hand, the reason behind the judgment in SANRAL 1 was substantially 
based on the doctrine of separation of powers and the non-amenability of the subject 
matter of the dispute to adjudication. After all, the Court was invited in that case to 
make an order to prevent the Government from going ahead with its e-tolling 
arrangements. Such an order would have meant that having spent huge sums of 
borrowed money, the State would be unable to repay its debts since its plans to levy and 
collect the e-tolls from motorists would have been blocked through a court order. Had 
such an order been made, it would have culminated in the Court descending into the 
arena of controversy surrounding the project, and jurisprudentially, no better 
illustration could have been found of a court being entangled in the web of polycentric 
wrangling and in the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.      
 
                                                 
137 Constitution s 84(2)(f). For a discussion of the scope of the power to appoint a commission of inquiry 
see, President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 
paras 146-155. 
138 Marikana 1 at paras 15-16.  
